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TOR: 301420Z AUG 89

43

1. C/O [] MET WITH [] (P/1) AND
TRANSLATOR/CUT-OUT [] (T/1) EVENING OF 28 AUG 89 IN MALTA
S/H "PAUL." NO SECURITY OR CI INCIDENTS NOTED DURING 90 MINUTE
MEETING. NEXT MEETING SCHEDULED FOR 31 AUG WITH [] OFFICER
[] FOR P/1 DEBRIEFING FOLLOWED BY EVENING 4 SEP FOR []
[] MEDICAL CHECK-UP.

2. INTEL: P/1 UPDATED LIBYAN SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE
OFFICER PRESENCE IN MALTA OUTLINED BELOW:

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: FEB 2008

A. LAA OFFICE:

- LT COL KHALIFA ((SANUSSI)) - CHIEF ESO/LAA;
COVER POSITION STATION MANAGER, HOLDS LUQA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
(LIA) FULL ACCESS CLEARANCE
- MAJOR NEJMI TINJAL ((AGELW)) - DEPUTY CHIEF
ESO/LAA; COVER POSITION STATION MANAGER, LIA FULL ACCESS CLEARANCE
- ALI ((JA-AD)), ESO OFFICER
- SALAH ((QAJA)), ESO OFFICER
- MUSTAFFAH ((SHABANI)), AN LAA EMPLOYEE COOPERATES
WITH THE ESO STATION. THE OTHER TWO LAA EMPLOYEES, BASHIR
((UTHMAN)) (AREA MANAGER) AND FARAG ((AL-BURKI)) (ACCOUNTS
MANAGER), CONDUCT NORMAL LAA DUTIES. THE LAA OFFICE ALSO EMPLOY
MALTESE DENNIS ((VELLA)) FOR MARKETING AND FOUR MALTESE SALESGIRLS
(NFI). ALL LIBYAN OFFICIALS ROTATE EVERY 1 AND 1/2 MONTHS BETWEEN
THE LAA OFFICES IN VALLETTA AND LIA. PER P/1 THE LAA/ESO OFFICERS
ARE TASKED TO GATHER INTEL, MAINTAIN LAA AIRPLANE SECURITY AND
MONITOR OTHER LIBYANS IN MALTA.

B. ACCORDING TO [] LAA PILOTS AND CREWS DO NOT CONDUCT ANY
INTEL OR SECURITY FUNCTIONS. BECAUSE OF SEVERAL INCIDENTS
INVOLVING CREWS WHICH SMUGGLED DRUGS AND ALCOHOL TO/FROM LIBYA AND
THE FACT THAT LAA CREWS ARE CIVILIAN, THE ESO CONSIDERS THEM TO BE
UNRELIABLE. LAA/ESO OFFICERS WHO ACCOMPANY EVERY LAA FLIGHT (ONE
OR TWO DEPENDING ON NUMBER OF PASSENGERS) ACT AS COURIERS FOR
LETTERS OR SMALL PACKAGES FROM ESO OR OTHER SECURITY SERVICES TO
LIBYA. THESE OFFICERS ARE IN LAA UNIFORMS BUT SIT WITH THE
PASSENGERS AND DO NOT DEPLANE UNTIL THEY ARE BACK IN LIBYA. THEY
ALSO MONITOR THE ACTIVITIES OF THE PASSENGERS AND CREW.

C. LPB: ESO/CHIEF IN MALTA IS MUHAMMAD ((AL-LAFI)) AND HIS
ASSISTANT IS HABIB UMAR ((SASI)) WHOM P/1 DESCRIBED AS A
LOW-RANKING OFFICER. ALTHOUGH AL-LAFI IS THE CHIEF, P/1 CLAIMED
LT COL SANUSSI UNDERTOOK MANY OPERATIONS INDEPENDENT OF HIS CHIEF
AL-LAFI. THEY MEET A MINIMUM OF THREE TO FOUR TIMES PER WEEK.

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D. AND THE REST: AMIR ((SAHID)), A JANA JOURNALIST, IS A MEMBER OF THE INTERNAL SERVICE, GENERAL INVESTIGATIONS DEPARTMENT (GID) AND BASED OUT OF THE LIBYAN CULTURAL CENTER. P/1 BELIEVES THERE IS ANOTHER ESO OFFICER [REDACTED] ACTING IN THE ASSISTANT MANAGER POSITION AT THE LIBYAN-OWNED CORTINTHIA HOTEL, AND SOME SUPPORT IS PROVIDED BY THE MALTESE-LIBYAN HOLDING COMPANY LOCATED OUTSIDE VALLETTA CITY GATE. PER P/1, MUHAMMAD ((SHAMBISH)), MANAGER OF THE JERMA PALACE HOTEL, ALSO LIBYAN-OWNED, HAS A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH AHMAD ((QADAFI)), COUSIN OF COLONEL QADAFI. ALL IN ALL, THERE ARE SIX CONFIRMED ESO (EXCLUDING HABIB) AND ONE GID OFFICER IN MALTA. P/1 ADDED THAT THERE ARE MANY OTHER LIBYAN-OWNED OR FINANCED BUSINESSES IN MALTA WHICH COULD BE CALLED ON IF NECESSARY.

3. AS REPORTED [REDACTED] P/1 DOES NOT BELIEVE EXPLOSIVES HIDDEN IN AN UNACCOMPANIED SUITCASE COULD BE INSERTED INTO THE HANDLING PROCESS AT LIA. LAA/ESO OFFICERS' ACCESS TO LIA FACILITIES AND PERSONNEL SUGGEST THAT THEY COULD DEVELOP/RECRUIT SOURCES THERE, HOWEVER. P/1 ALSO SAID THAT EXPLOSIVES COULD BE BROUGHT INTO MALTA VIA DIP POUCH, HANDED OVER TO LAA/ESO AND INSERTED ON TO A FLIGHT IF LAA HAD THE APPROPRIATE HUMINT SOURCE. P/1 KNOWS OF NO INSTANCE WHEN EXPLOSIVES WERE PLACED ON AIRPLANES, ALTHOUGH HE CERTAINLY COULD HAVE BEEN COMPARTMENTED FROM THIS TYPE OF INFORMATION. BECAUSE P/1 BELIEVES HE HAD THE BEST CONTACTS AT LIA, HE DOES NOT THINK THIS TYPE OF OPERATION COULD HAVE BEEN SLIPPED BY HIM.

4. IN A RELATED MATTER, P/1 IS DEVELOPING DEPUTY LIA SECURITY CHIEF [REDACTED] BY PROVIDING HIM WITH A FREE MALTA-LONDON-DUBLIN AIR TICKET FOR HIS DAUGHTER. P/1, WHO IS PERSONALLY PAYING FOR THE TICKET, BELIEVES THIS INVESTMENT WILL PAY OFF FOR HIM PROFESSIONALLY DOWN THE ROAD. (STATION PLANS TO WAIVE P/1 OFF OF THIS VENTURE SINCE [REDACTED] IS CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH THE MALTESE "INTELLIGENCE" SERVICE AND BECAUSE HE INSINUATED TO C/O [REDACTED] THAT HE HAD PLAYED A ROLE IN EFFECTING THE PNG OF [REDACTED] FROM MALTA. WE BELIEVE THAT P/1 COULD LIKELY JEOPARDIZE HIS STATUS IN MALTA SHOULD HE CONTINUE THIS PURSUIT.)

5. OPS: AS MEETING WAS CLOSING, C/O RAISED POSSIBILITY OF REVIEWING P/1'S COMMO PLAN. ASKED ABOUT HIS [REDACTED] NUMBER AND PAROLE, P/1 REFERRED TO T/1 WHO RECITED FROM NOTES IN HER ADDRESS-BOOK. P/1 DID NOT APPEAR TO HAVE MADE ANY EFFORT TO MEMORIZE THE COMMO PLAN.

[REDACTED] C/O STRESSED TO P/1 THAT HE REVIEW HIS COMMO ALONE AND C/O WOULD RAISE THE ISSUE (WITHOUT T/1 PRESENT) AT THE NEXT MEETING. BELIEVE P/1'S ACCEPTANCE OF IMPERSONAL COMMO IS RELUCTANT AT BEST. WE PLAN TO DISCUSS THIS ISSUE WITH [REDACTED] OFFICER [REDACTED] BEFORE NEXT MEETING.

END OF MESSAGE

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[REDACTED] SECRET [REDACTED]